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.FOOD AID: A CAUSE, OR SYMPTOM OF DEVELOPMENT FAILURE 
OR AN INSTRUMENT FOR SUCCESS? 
T. N. Srinivasan 
February 1988 
Abstract 
The role of foreign aid in the form of food in furthering economic 
development of poor countries and in alleviating adverse impacts on the 
poor of structural and sectoral adjustment programmes in these countries 
is discussed. A simple analytical framework for evaluating the incentive 
and welfare impacts of food aid is suggested. Because of policy 
interventions, domestic and international markets for food have been 
historically subject to severe distortions leading to ever growing food 
stocks in some, mainly rich, countries while in others, largely poor, 
many cannot afford to consume enough food. The possible impact of 
distortion-free global food markets is sketched. The use of surplus food 
for payment of wages-in-kind to workers employed in rural works programmes 
thereby creating productive assets while alleviating poverty has often 
been proposed. With an applied general equililbrium model of the Indian 
economy, it is shown that a well-designed and efficiently implemented 
food-for-work programme can virtually eliminate abject poverty in India at 
a modest cost. Experience with food aid in several other countries is 
also briefly discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
Any form of aid from one agent (individual, household, nation) to 
another is an unrequited transfer from the former to the latter. Yet the 
donor may often expect or receive some favors from the recipient in other 
forms (e.g. political concessions or support in exchange for economic 
aid). Aid need not always be beneficial to the recipient nor need it 
involve some sacrifice on the part of the donor. Some have suggested 
that developing countries, in accepting economic aid, have in effect 
obtained short-term benefits at the cost of long-term dependency. Others 
argue that aid (in which one should also include loans at concessionary 
terms) from governments and multilateral agencies is in large part a 
correction of the imperfect international markets for capital and risk 
sharing and shifting. Of course humanitarian concerns for the poor in 
developing countries and the desire to reduce tensions and political 
instability arising from economic deprivation are also among donor 
objectives. Besides objectives of donors and the impacts on recipients, 
there are issues relating to quality of aid (whether it is tied to 
projects, commodities or to purchases from donors, or it is completely 
unfettered program aid) and its effectiveness in achieving whatever 
objecives the donors and recipients expected to achieve. Two very 
interesting recent studies, Gassen (1984) and Krueger and Ruttan (1983), 
explore the larger concerns about aid in depth. This paper is limited to 
food aid and its role in furthering economic development of poor 
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countries. Food aid can also be helpful in alleviating adverse impacts on 
the poor of structural and sectoral adjustment programs that many 
developing countries are undertaking. Some of the ground is well covered 
in the voluminous literature on food aid (Hopkins (1984, 1987), Mellor and 
Ezekiel (1987), World Food Programme (1983, 1985), Wallerstein (1980) to 
mention only a select few). It is hoped that this paper will add some 
insights to those available in them. For an iconoclastic analysis of 
hunger, see Lappe and Collins (1977). 
Food aid by definition is commodity tied aid: it makes available 
certain quantitites of one or more commodities (foodgrains, edible oils 
and fats, dairy products etc) at concessional terms, if not as outright 
gifts, to recipients. Food aid, other than as emergency relief when 
famines or other abnormal circumstances arise, is of two forms: project 
aid, where food aid is tied to the implementation of projects mutually 
agreed upon by the donor and recipient, and untied program aid. If a 
project is defined broadly enough to include policy reforms or changes, 
then the so-called policy conditional food aid would be covered under 
project aid. I will discuss emergency food aid for relief of famines and 
natural disasters only briefly. My concern is mainly with longer term 
food aid. 
Hopkins (1984) points out that food aid has evolved from its inception 
in the fifties as a means for disposal of food surpluses in donor 
countries to a policy tool for promoting economic development in the 
recipient countries in the eighties. The volume of food aid has 
fluctuated reaching a low ironically during the food crisis of 1973-74. 
The recovery since then has not restored the volume to the levels of the 
mid-sixties. Table 1 provides the relevant data. In the mid-sixties the 
USA was essentially .the only food aid donor. By the mid-eighties EEC has 
emerged as a significant donor. In large part this reflects the growth of 
-3-
food surpluses in the EEC as a consequence of its common agricultural 
policy of price support and protection of agriculture within EEC and the 
reduction in US food stocks. Thus, surplus disposal as an objective has 
not completely disappeared from the food aid scene. Even though 
liberalization of agricultural trade is one of the items on the agenda of 
the ongoing Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations and the costs 
of domestic agricultural subsidy programs are spiralling in the US and 
EEC, it is unlikely that either the programs or the surpluses will 
disappear anytime soon. 
Food aid can further economic development of developing countries 
through several channels: first and foremost, just as any form of aid it 
adds resources that can be used for current consumption or accumulation; 
second, it provides balance of payments support just as any other form of 
foreign aid; third, as food aid, it augments the domestic availability of 
food (though not necessarily on a one-to-one basis); fourth, to the extent 
it is targeted at the poor it can alleviate poverty which is a major goal 
of economic development. By improving the health and nutritional status of 
the poor it augments their human capital and future income earning 
capability; fifth, food aid tied to development-oriented projects that 
would not have been undertaken otherwise, promotes development; and sixth, 
to the extent it can be credibly tied to the initiation of 
growth-promoting policies and reform, if not abandonement, of policies 
detrimental to growth, it can obviously promote development. This last 
role can be important in the structural adjustment process. Adjustment to 
unanticipated shocks as well as reform of entrenched policies involve 
political and economic costs. External aid, including food aid, can in 
some situations increase the credibility of reforms by alleviating these 
costs. The operative word in all the above is "can" and not "will." 
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Table 1 
Cereal Aid by Principal Donors 
(Million tons) 
Donor 1965-66 1967-68 1972-73 1974-75 1984-85 
Australia 0.19 0.26 0.33 0.48 
Canada 0.80 0.81 0.61 0.94 
EEC 0.99 1.41 2.47 
USA 17.32 13.50 6.95 4. 72 7.54 
TOTAL 17.73 16.22 9.96 8.40 12.52 
(including others) 
Source: Food And Agriculture Organization (1985) Food Aid in Figures, 
Rome. 
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Whether the potential of food aid for furthering development will be 
realized in full measure depends on the flexibility with which it is used, 
whether other objectives of donors conflict with the objective of economic 
development, and whether the domestic, economic, political and 
institutional environment in recipient countries is conducive to efficient 
utilization of food aid as a development tool. 
Section 2 is devoted to the analytics of food aid. In Section 3 the 
impact of global agricultural trade liberalization is taken up. Since 
surplus disposal has been an objective of food aid and the emergence of 
agricultural surpluses in the developed (and even in some developing) 
countries is a consequence of protection, it is worth analyzing the costs 
and benefits to developing countries of a liberal trade regime in 
agriculture. It is also worthwhile to see what extent additional food 
availability in the global market, as contrasted with targeted aid, will 
improve nutritional status in developing countries through reduced world 
prices of food. This section will draw on the simulations from the Basic 
Linked System of Models (BLS) of the Food and Agriculture Project of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). In Section 
4, the India model of the BLS is used to analyze the impact on the poor of 
an expansion of the subsidized system of public distribution of foodgrains 
and of the so-called food-for-work program in which rural labor from poor 
households are employed in slack agricultural seasons in creating public 
works (roads, irrigation works, schools, etc) and paid in kind (at least 
in part) with foodgrains. These simulations are of some interest, since 
one of the more important objectives of food aid is poverty amelioration 
and improvement of nutritional status, and food-for-work programs are 
prime examples of projects to which food aid is tied. Section 5 briefly 
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reviews some salient features of the experience with food aid. Section 6 
concludes the paper with few remarks on past experience with food aid and 
policy implications for the future. 
2. Some Simple Analytics of Food Aid 
The standard work horse of international trade theory, the two 
commodity general equilibrium model, can be used to illustrate some of the 
analytical issues involved in food aid, as indeed, Bhagwati (1986) did to 
great effect. We reproduce and extend his analysis below. Consider a 
country producing and consuming two aggregate commodities, food and 
non-food. The production possibility frontier (PPF) of this country is AB 
in Figure 1. The preferences of its citizens are represented by a set of 
Samuelson social indifference curves (SIC). Assume, to begin with, that 
the country is in autarkic equilibrium with its production and consumption 
at P0 , where the SIC represented by CC touches the PPF. The equilibrium 
domestic relative price of food in terms of non-food is the common slope 
of the PPF and SIC at P0 • The common tangent is shown as PP. Suppose the 
country (its government) is offered food aid, gratis, in the amount AAl. 
What will be its effect on domestic prices, production and welfare? Of 
course, the answer will depend on how the recipient government responds to 
aid and/or conditions, if any, that the donor imposes on the recipient. 
2.1. Incentive Effects 
(a) Suppose the government sells the food received as aid in the 
open market and returns the sale proceeds to consumers as lump sum income 
transfers. The resulting equilibrium can be derived by shifting the PPF 
to the right by the distance AAl so that the domestic availability curve 









slope of PP (hereafter referred simply as price PP), output will be at po 
AAso that domestic availability is at A 
A 
at which the slope of the tangent PP 
to the availability curve MlBl also equals the price PP. If we assume 
for simplicity that social preferences are homothetic, demand at price PP 
and disposable income OP 
A 
in terms of food (including the value of food and 
received as lump sum transfers) will be cl. Thus, there will be an excess 
supply (demand) of food (non-food) forcing relative food prices down. 
Equilibrium obtains at the point A1 to the left of Al on the availability 
curve at which an SIC (not shown) touches it. The corresponding 
production point is pl on the PPF to the left of P0 • Comparing pl with 
P0 , it is seen that the equilibrium domestic relative price of food (i.e. 
the slope of PPF at pl) has fallen and so has the output food. This 
illustrates the oft-cited production disincentive effect of food aid. Is 
this undesirable and inevitable? The answer is clearly no. Before we 
illustrate other possibilities, let us note that even though domestic 
price of food and its output have fallen, consumer welfare at cl is 
clearly higher than at P0 • With the use of lump sum transfers to counter 
any adverse income distributional effects among citizens, and given that 
aid is a transfer that augments the commodity availability set of the 
economy, it can only improve social welfare. That is, gainers from aid, 
i.e. consumers as a whole and non-food producers, can fully compensate the 
losers, i.e. food producers, and still gain. Thus the fall in the 
relative price of food and its output have not led to any undesirable 
consequences in this illustration. 
Suppose the government wishes to maintain producer incentives while 
absorbing food aid by not allowing domestic relative price to fall from 
APP. To be able to do this, consumers have to be in equilibrium at A. 
They will be, if the relative price of food facing them is the slope of 
A
the SIC passing through A. Clearly this price will be lower than PP. 
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A AA AA AlC1 both lie on PP. Since an SIC touches PP at C , the slope of an SIC 
passing through AA which is to the right of CAl (i.e. involving more 
consumption of food than at cl) has to be smaller. This implies that a 
food subsidy for consumers (or equivalently a tax on non-food) will be 
Acalled for to ensure consumption at A. With this distortionary wedge 
between consumer and producer prices, it is not surprising that consumer 
welfare at A (where an SIC intersects AAlBl)) is lower than at Al (where 
an SIC touches AAlBl)), but of course higher than at P0 • If the 
intervention is in the form of a consumption tax on non-food, the problem 
of financing does not arise--the tax revenue as well as the proceeds from 
food aid are returned to consumers as lump sum transfers. This is seen as 
follows (Figure 2). Value of consumption in terms of untaxed food (at Al) 
at consumer prices= OTl = Value of production at producer prices OT0 (= 
factor income)+ Taxes on non-food consumption T0 T0 + Value of food aid 
T0 Tl. Tax revenue equals T0 T0 because the value of non-food 
consumption (P0 Q0 ) at tax inclusive consumer prices is Q0 T0 , while its 
value at producer prices is Q0 T0 , the difference being the tax revenue. 
Suppose taxing non-food consumption is infeasible. Then food 
cnsumption has to be subsidized--thus, part of the value of food aid (at 
domestic prices) is used up in financing the subsidy and the rest is 
transferred to consumers in a lump sum. Thus, ovl, the value of 
consumption at domestic consumer prices in terms of non-food= Value of 
production at producer prices ov0 - Food consumption subsidy vlvo + 
Value of food aid vovl. Food subsidy equals vlv0 since the value of 
food consumption at subsidized prices equals R0 vl, while its value at 
producer prices is R0 v 0 . 







through a production subsidy on food relative to the consumer price at A 
A 
or equivalently a production tax on non-food. Again when subsidya 
instrument is used only that part of the value of food aid net of subsidy 
is transferred to consumers in lump sum. For completeness, take the first 
case. Here the value of consumption in terms of non-food ovl = Value of 
production at consumer prices ov0 + Production Subsidy v 0 v0 Value of-
food aid vlvo. 
The essential points of these illustrations are simply these: food aid 
being an unrequited transfer adds to domestic resources and at the same 
time, adds to domestic food availability. Under laissez-faire, with 
prices unchanged, since the additional resources will not be all spent on 
food, relative price of food has to fall to absorb the additional food. 
However, consumer welfare will unambiguously rise. An intervention is 
needed if the price fall is to be prevented or mitigated. If this 
intervention takes the form of a food consumption subsidy or an equivalent 
production subsidy, part of the additional resources will be used up in 
financing the subsidy. This distortion-creating intervention will reduce 
the welfare gain from food aid compared to laissez-faire, but the gain is 
still positive. Thus the fall in food prices with aid is neither 
undesirable, if it occurs as in the laissez faire situation, nor is it 
inevitable, since it can be prevented through government intervention 
albeit at some welfare cost. 
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2.2 Mitigating Price Inflation 
It is sometimes suggested that food aid, far from creating a 
(production) disincentive effect due to a fall in relative price of food, 
will in fact help mitigate price inflation that would have come about in 
its absence. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that food aid 
alleviates an incipient excess demand at the initial prices. Presumably 
the excess demand arises because the government expands development 
expenditure without at the same time raising the needed resources through 
taxes. It is not always made clear whether the argument is about general 
price inflation or about the possible rise in relative price of food (i.e. 
food price inflation). We will illustrate both versions, although 
illustrating nominal price inflation using a real model and diagram is a 
bit clumsy: in what follows nominal flows and real flows are both measured 
in the same axis and the underlying monetary system and behaviour are left 
implicit. 
Consider first the case when the government wishes to acquire goods 
worth T0 Tl (see Figure 3) in terms of food at the initial prices, say, for 
public investment. Given our homotheticity assumption, if it levies a 
lump sum tax equal to T0 T1 in terms of food, private consumption will 
move to cl with no change in prices and the government would have 
acquired the resources. Suppose such taxation is infeasible but the 
government nevertheless attempts to acquire these resources by adding to 
aggregate spending in the amount T0 Tl (where T0 Tl T0 Tl) so that 
aggregate spending in nominal terms is OTl. Assume that the composition 
of government demand in terms of food and non-food is the same as private 
demand. Aggregate demand at nominal expenditure oTl and at initial prices 
will then move to cl, while output stays put at P0 , thus creating excess 






expenditure of government) both unchanged at OT0 and T0 Tl respectively, a 
nominal price inflation (in the ratio T0 Tl/oTl) will push real aggregate 
expenditure back to OT0 and equilibrium is restored. However, the 
government acquires only a proportion, OT0 /oTl, of the resources it wished 
to acquire through the "inflation tax." Of course, it could have acquired 
real resources equal to T0 Tl if its nominal expenditure has been set at a 
level that would have produced real revenues through the inflation tax of 
that order. 
Before turning to aid tied to food, let us dispose of a simpler case 
of untied aid. If non-food aid is also available, if the government 
received both commodities in amounts equal to the difference between cl 
and OP0 , then clearly there will be no price inflation--oTl will in fact 
be real expenditure (and not nominal expenditure). The. government acquires 
the resources it needs entirely through aid. 
Food aid, being tied to food, will not enable the government to 
acquire non-food it needs for its investment without intervening in the 
domestic market. Assume, for simplicity, that the commodity composition 
of government investment is flexible so that the set of investment 
"isoquants" are the same as the set consumer indifference curves and the 
government maximizes the 'quantity' of investment given its expenditure 
and the relative price of food. Then, with food aid in the amount BBl 
becoming available, by letting the relative price of non-food to rise, 
equilibrium is established with aggregate use at cl and production at pl 
(Figure 3). Private consumption will be at clP, the difference betwen cl 
and clP represents government investment bundle. Of course, if the 
relative price of non-food for producers (or consumers) is to be kept 
unchanged, then as earlier an appropriate indirect tax or subsidy will be 
needed as an additional instrument and part of the aid may be used up in 
financing a subsidy. 
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2.3 Usual Marketing Requirements or Additionality 
Let us now turn to the more realistic world in which the economy 
receiving fo~d aid is open to international trade. To keep matters 
simple, let us avoid incentive issues discussed above by assuming the 
economy is a price taker in world markets and is rationally following a 
free trade policy. In the pre-aid equilibrium (Figure 4) production is at 
P0 , consumption is at c 0 (with the slope of P0 c 0 representing the relative 
price of food in world markets). Food imports equal c 0 o0 . Suppose now 
food aid in the amount T0 Tl becomes available. With prices unchanged 
(because of free trade), production remains at P0 , availability moves to 
Al and consumption moves to cl (under homotheticity). Food imports rise 
to clol. However clol is less than the sum of the pre-aid commercial 
imports c 0 n° and food aid T0 Tl. Thus, part of food aid has been used to 
replace commercial imports. 
Food aid donors would not wish to see their commercial sales reduced 
as a consequence of food aid. For this reason they impose what are called 
"usual marketing requirements" (UMR) as a condition for providing food 
aid. These can take various forms. But for simplicity assume that the 
donors require that the recipient country continue to import at least as 
much as she did from commercial channels prior to food aid. This means, 
given the aid, total imports (aid plus commercial) has to be at least c 0 o0 
+ T0 Tl. As is well-known from the theory of non-economic objectives 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969)) the optimum policy to absorb food imports 
exceeding the level that would obtain under laissez faire is to have an 
import subsidy. This means that the domestic price of food will fall 
below world prices, thereby discouraging (encouraging) domestic production 
(consumption) of food sufficiently to increase imports of food 
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to the required extent. In Figure 4 an import subsidy on food moves the 
production point to p2 from P0 , thus lowering (raising) the output of food 
(non-food), availability to A2 and consumption to c2 on the world price 
line through A2 at which the slope of SIC is the same as the subsidy 
inclusive domestic price (that is, the same as the slope of the PPF at 
pl). Food imports c2n2 now equals pre-aid imports c 0 n° plus food aid. 
Such a policy minimizes the welfare loss (relative to laissez faire) 
associated with meeting UMR. 
This brings to the fore a possible conflict between the two objectives 
of the donors, namely between the desire to see incentives for food 
production in the recipient country not being adversely affected and the 
desire to see that export markets for food for donors are not adversely 
affected by aid. UMR serves the latter objective at the expense of the 
former if the optimal response of the recipient country through an import 
subsidy reduces the domestic price of food there. Of course, if the 
donors insist on both objectives being met, they will force the recipient 
country to use the policy of a food consumption subs.idy rather than the 
first-best import subsidy, thereby imposing on it a further welfare loss 
relative to laissez-faire. 
2.4. Food Aid and Nutritional Improvement of the Nutritional Status 
of the Poor 
One of the objectives of food aid on the part of donors is the desire 
to improve the income and nutritional status of the poor in recipient 
countries thorugh some forms of targeted food aid. To explore this set of 
issues, let us utilize a partial equilibrium analysis as contrasted with 
the general equilibrium analysis of the earlier sections. On the other 
hand, let us be more general in another direction by considering the 
global food market. More specifically, let us aggregate all donors of 






exporting food to the latter. Let us distinguish two distinct groups of 
consumers within the recipient region: the poor who have fairly price 
elastic demand and the rich who have fairly inelastic demand. Again for 
simplicity, assume that there is no domestic production of food in the 
recipient region. For the sake of variety let us illustrate with 
numerically specified export supply and demand functions rather than with 
diagrams! 
The export supply function of the donor region is 0.9 + p, where pis 
the price per unit. The demand functions of the rich and poor 
respectively are 10 -.Olp, 0 s p s 100 and 2 - .lp, 0 s p s 20. In free 
trade with no aid the market clears at a price of 10, with donor region 
exporting 10.9 uni;ts of which 9.9 units are consumed by the rich and 1 
unit by the poor in the recipient region. Suppose now the farm lobby in 
the donor region succeeds in raising the domestic price of food (by a 
'modest' 5.5%) to 10.55. Export surplus goes up to 11.45. Were this is 
to be "dumped" in the recipient country market, the price would fall by 
50% to 5, with the consumption of the rich going up to 9.95 and the poor 
to 1.50. Thus, export revenue would fall from 109 to 57.25! The cost to 
the donor country treasury of acquiring and dumping the surplus arising 
out of the domestic price increase would be (10.55 - 5) x 11.45 = 63.5475. 
Policy makers in donor countries begin thinking that there must be better 
ways of disposing of .the surplus created by their domestic price policy 
than to dump it in world markets! One such idea is food aid tied to its 
being used for the 'poor' in the recipient country. 
The donor offers 1.55 units of the surplus food free to the recipient 
country to be sold to the poor, the resulting revenues being kept by the 
recipient country government. The rest of the surplus, i.e. 9.9 units is 
sold to the rich. Assuming that the markets in which the poor and rich 
buy their food are segmented so that the transactions cost for the poor 
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reselling to the rich at a higher price what they buy in their market are 
prohibitive, the sale in the rich market will yield a price of 10. Thus 
the price paid by the rich, and their consumption are the same as in the 
free trade equilibrium. The consumption of the poor rises by 55% to 1.55, 
the price they pay also falls by 55% to 4.5 as compared to the free trade 
equilibrium. The donors realize a revenue of 10 x 9.9 = 99 on the sales 
to the rich, thereby reducing the cost of their domestic price support 
program to 21.7975 from 63.5475, a reduction of more than 65%. The 
recipient country government realizes a revenue of 6.975 from the sale of 
food aid to the poor. Thus, in the recipient country, with aid, the rich 
are just as well off as in the free trade situation, the poor much better 
off and the government acquires revenues. As compared to the hypothetical 
equilibrium with dumping, in the aid equilibrium in the recipient region 
poor are better off, the rich marginally worse off (their food consumption 
under dumping would have been higher by .05 units or 5%), and the 
government is better off (it gets no revenue under dumping). The donor 
government, given that it has to raise domestic prices, is better off. in 
the aid equilibrium compared to dumping, since it saves over 65% on the 
cost of price support! 
The essence of the above example is that by inducing the recipient 
country to isolate the market with more i.e.elastic demand, the poor 
market, with the carrot of food aid and the right to keep the revenue from 
sales to the poor, the donor government achieves price discrimination. 
Indeed, it can do even better by giving the poor 2 units of food free of 
charge and selling the remaining 9.45 units to the rich at a whopping 
price of 55 (a jump of 550% over the price in free trade) and realize a 
revenue of 519.75 and make a profit of 420.9975! Clearly, the rich in the 
recipient country will strenuously resist such gouging! Achieving price 
discrimination through food aid with the consent and cooperation of the 
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recipient country government is the next best thing to gouging! Be that 
as it may, there is no reason to believe that monopolistic exploitation as 
ever the motivation of those who thought of food aid tied to the poor in 
recipient country as a less costly way of dealing with surpluses than 
dumping. However, that the cost saving in surplus disposal was achieved 
essentially through price discrimination is a realistic presumption. 
2.5 Project Tying, Commodity Composition of Aid, and Use of Counterpart 
Funds 
Food aid by definition is tied aid: it is tied to a commodity or set 
of food commodities given as aid. However, as we saw earlier, if there 
are no onerous usual marketing requirements and as long as the recipient 
country imports these commodities commercially and the volume of aid is 
not too large relative to commercial imports, commodity tying is of no 
consequence. Sometimes food aid is tied to particular projects, assuch 
food for work projects (more on this below) in which part or a whole of 
the wages of workers employed in such projects are paid in kind with food 
received under food aid. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
availability of food aid led to the choice and implementation of projects 
that should not have been chosen. In any case, if projects proposed for 
implementation are evaluated using techniques of social cost-benefit 
analysis in which food aid is valued at its social opportunity cost, the 
availability of food aid per se will not necesarily make a project (that 
would not have been socially worthwhile if food were to be commercially 
imported) pass the social cost-benefit test. The social cost of food 
obtained through aid has to be sufficiently below its commercial import 
cost to bring it about. 
Food aid, originating as it did with the accumulated surpluses in 
donor countries, is more often than not offered in commodities which 
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happen to be in surplus, mainly wheat, rice, corn, yellow maize and dairy 
products. As most of these commodities are internationally traded, the 
fact that aid comes in a particular commodity composition need not create 
any special problem to the recipent if onerous usual marketing 
requirements are not imposed 'as part of aid. By substituting for 
commercial imports or exports appropriately, aid can be absorbed without 
any domestic production effect. Even if the recipient country does not 
trade, as long as there are substitution possibliities either in the 
domestic production and consumption basket, aid can be absorbed by 
suitably altering the domestic production and consumption baskets through 
appropriate price changes. Of course, a problem can arise if conditions 
imposed on the recipient preclude trading part or whole of the aid given 
in one commodity for others needed and if there are absolutely no 
substitution possibilities in production and consumption. An example of 
such aid is yellow maize offered to Kenyans who prefered white maize. 
Since the same donor often provides aid to many countries with differing 
preferences and production possibilities, by permitting the recipients to 
exchange commodities received in aid for others which they can supply, the 
utility of aid to each recipient can be enhanced without affecting the 
donor's interests. Indeed, if such a swap can be planned ahead, some 
saving in transportation and other tansaction costs can be attained as 
well. 
A potentially more serious problem arising from food aid is the change 
in consumption preferences in the long run in the recipient country 
towards the commodities supplied as aid. Although a shift towards 
imported 'superior' cereals (wheat and rice) supplied by aid and way from 
domestically produced 'inferior' coarse grains has been observed in West 
Africa (Delgado and Miller (1985)), as Mellor and Ezekiel (1987) point out 
that this shift may be simply a reflection of higher Engel elasticity for 
-22-
wheat and rice, in addition to the effect of lowered price of wheat and 
rice brought about in part for absorbing aid. In other words, the shift 
in commodity composition of consumption reflects the same preferences 
(i.e. set of indifference maps), and changing budget constraints (prices 
and incomes) rather than a change in the preferences. 
The possible real problem is not the shift in consumption patterns or 
preferences but the fact that the continuance of food aid in the 
indefinite future is uncertain, and even if it continues, its volume will 
certainly fluctuate. Thus, food aid can be cut or withdrawn in an 
unanticipated fashion. If the resources allocated away from the 
production of commodities supplied under aid to others cannot be flexibly 
be reallocated without excessive cost, then foreign exchange will have to 
be spent to import commodities when they are no longer supplied or 
supplied in smaller volumes under aid. In other words, unanticipated 
withdrawal of food aid constitutes an adverse shock to which the economy 
will have to adjust. And as with adjustment to any adverse (favourable) 
shock, the greater the flexibility with which resources can be reallocated 
the lower will be the social cost (greater will be the social benefit) of 
adjustment. There is sustantial evidence (Balassa (1985)) that economies 
which have maintained a neutral foreign trade regime between earning 
foreign exchange through export promotion and saving foeign exchange 
through import subsitution beyond that would have been dictated by dynamic 
comparative advantage considerations, have not only achieved efficient and 
rapid economic growth but have weathered bettter the adverse oil and 
interest rate shocks since 1973. Apart from the foreign trade regime, 
domestic distortions of various kinds, including those adversely affecting 
producer incentives in agriculture, and capability to respond to changing 
economic environment, including in particular to the availability of new 
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technologies, can impose high and avoidable social costs of adjustment. 
Most of the above analysis was based on the assumption that food aid 
was an unrequited transfer. In reality this is not quite so. Until 1972 
or so, the revenues generated in recipient country's currency (the 
so-called counterpart funds) by the sale of food aid received under US 
Public Law 480 Title I were put in some special accounts, the disbursal 
from which was governed by agreements between the US and recipient country 
governments. In effect the value of food aid was a US asset, albeit in 
local currency, but over the use of which the recipient had some say. 
Part of it was used for some US embassy expenses and part as a grant for 
investment on agreed projects. To the extent such expenses would have 
been incurred and such projects would have been aided even if counterpart 
funds were not available, use of local currency assets for such purposes 
meant that foreign exchange that would otherwise have accrued to the 
recipient did not. Thus, the foreign exchange saved by the recipient to 
the extent food aid replaced commercial food imports was 'lost' later in 
the sense of potential foreign exchange inflow foregone. 
In cases where the project would not have been aided but for the 
availability of US assets in local currency, nor undertaken by the 
recipient in the absence of aid, the undertaking of the project adds to 
domestic demand which would have been otherwise absent, thereby adding to 
inflationary pressures usually present in many developing countries. Even 
otherwise since the use of accumulated counterpart funds is not associated 
with any fresh inflow of food or other commodities from abroad, some have 
argued that it is inflationary. In India there was an extensive debate on 
PL480 aid (Rath and Patvardhan (1967), Shenoy (1974)) and in particular on 
the inflationary potential of the use of PL480 funds and also whether the 
deposits of such funds in special accounts added to the money supply 
growth thereby adding another source of potential inflation [Sundaram 
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(1970) and the references cited by him)]. The debate was inconclusive, 
mostly because, whether or not the inflationary potential, if any, was 
realized depended on the assumptions one made about the actions 
(accomodating or sterilising) of the Indian government and monetary 
authorities. 
2.6 Food Aid Dependency, Neglect of Agriculture and Long-Term 
Development 
The permanent shift in consumption preferences towards commodities 
supplied as aid is only one example of alleged long-term deleterious 
consequences of food aid. One such consequence is said to be the 
complacency on the part of the recipient with a poorly performing 
agricultural sector, if not outright discrimination in favour of other 
sectors, in the confident expectation that food aid will be forthcoming to 
solve any emerging food problems, an attitude, it is claimed, that can be 
changed only by withdrawing food aid or by making it costly, politically, 
if not economically. For example, it has been suggested that the 
availability of cheap food under PL 480 enabled Indian policy makers to 
neglect agriculture and pursue an import substituting industrialization 
strategy emphasizing heavy industry at the same time keeping the vocal 
urban population, including industrial workers and the bureaucracy, happy 
with public distribution of subsidized food and other essential 
commodities, It is also claimed that President Johnson's blackmailing 
India so to speak by approving PL-480 shipments on a month-to-month basis 
while India was threatened with famine after two successive years of 
unprecedented drought in 1965-66 and 1966-67 ostensibly to change India's 
stance towards the Vietnam War convinced Indian policy makers of the 
dangers of food aid dependency and that the political cost of the neglect 
of agriculture was too high. In this version of history Indian policy 
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makers dramatically shifted the incentives in favour of agriculture, the 
green revolution was facilitated and, lo and behold, India exported food 
in the late eighties! However, great this version may be of satisfaction 
to the players of aid hardball in Washington and equally to those in India 
who would like claim that they were responsible for putting India out of 
the reach of food blackmailers, the facts are more prosaic. As I showed 
elsewhere (Srinivasan 1986), the available data do not support the 
contention that agricultural sector was much more favoured by Indian 
economic planners in the period since the mid-sixties than before in terms 
of allocation of investment. Nor is there any evidence for any 
significant change in the trend rate of growth of output of foodgrains or 
for that matter real agricultural output as a whole between the two 
periods. What did happen is a change in the components of growth, 
relatively larger proportion in the later period being accounted for by 
improvements in yield per hectare of cropped area and a smaller proportion 
by expansion of area. Of course, as is to be expected, the performance of 
different crops was not the same, with the growth in output of wheat (and 
to a lesser extent, rice) being substantially faster in the later period 
because of the adoption of the green revolution technology. This also 
suggests, that if indeed the planners shifted resources towards 
agriculture in the later periods, it may have been a rational response to 
the rightward shift in the marginal productivity of investment schedule 
for agriculture because of the green revolution, a technology that became 
available only in the mid-sixties. 
The aid dependency argument is a multifaceted one. At the aggregate 
level, in an extreme form, it suggests that all foreign aid is used to 
substitute on a one-to-one basis for domestic savings, so that aggregate 
investment and hence the growth rate of aggregate output is unchanged. 
Thus, aid is simply consumed. Even in this form the implied behaviour of 
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the recipient is neither irrational nor suggestive of dependency. If aid 
(by which I mean the unrequited transfer element in external resource 
inflow) is confidently expected to be permanent, it is like an added 
permanent income flow. And theory would suggest that it be largely 
consumed. At the sectoral level, the argument has been stated earlier: 
availability food aid will either reduce producer prices and hence 
incentives to produce food and to invest in the capacity to produce food 
or simply end up increasing consumption of food (not necessarily on a 
one-to-one basis) with no impact on prices or incentives: As we saw in 
Section 2.1, both of these are essentially rational responses to a 
permanent availability of food aid. 
There is one form dependency argument that may make some sense: the 
recipient country embarks on a development strategy that is rational were 
aid to be permanent but in fact, aid is not, so that at some stage in the 
development process the country is faced with a cessation or reduction of 
aid that it did not anticipate. As argued above, this is equivalent to an 
adverse shock on an economy that has geared its resource allocation 
intertemporally to aid availability (i.e. had become dependent on aid!) 
and as such, suffers a cost of adjustment whose size will vary with the 
flexibility and efficiency of resource allocation. But unless the 
recipient's expectations about permanence of aid were irrational and not 
based on all available information about aid flows, it is a misuse of the 
term, to call the adverse consequence of unanticipated aid curtailment as 
the effect of aid dependency. On the other hand, if despite all the 
available information to the contrary, a recipient chose to act as if aid 
was permanent, it is this irrationality, rather than aid dependency, that 
is responsible for the inevitable cost of adjustment when aid ceases. 
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2.7 Famines and Food Aid 
Famine, according to the 1955 edition of the Oxford Universal 
Dictionary, means an instance of extreme and general scarcity of food, and 
in its transferred figuritive use, hunger and hence starvation. Yet not 
having enough food to feed everybody (i.e. general scarcity) does not mean 
everyone will starve. Equally, having enough food or more (i.e. absence 
of scarcity) to feed everybody does not mean that rumg_ will starve. 
Unless an individual has access to available food, directly or indirectly 
through having other things he can exchange for food, he is likely to 
starve regardless of food availability in the aggregate. This rather 
elementary and obvious point has been elaborately and elegantly made by 
Sen (1981). As documented by him, the Bengal famine of 1943, Bangladesh 
famine of 1974 and the Ethiopian famine of 1974 were not associated with 
any rapid decline in food availability. The Chinese famine of 1959-61 in 
which more than 20 million people are estimated to have died had much less 
to do with food availability shortfall and more to do with her political 
and economic system. Merely augmenting food availabiity per se through 
emergency food aid whenever an episode of famine is threatened may not be 
adequate to prevent starvation, let alone reduce the chances of future 
occurrence of famines. However, an overwhelming proportion of the world's 
poor depend on agricuture for their employment and income. As such, a 
serious crop failure erodes their incomes, and given the imperfection in 
credit and asset markets, they cannot borrow or sell their meagre assets 
to finance consumption except at high cost. In such circumstances, food 
(whether from foreign aid or from other crop failure free regions of the 
country) can be used for relief and food-for-work programs to employ those 
who can work and mass starvation can be avoided. Equally, if 
food-for-work programs financed by food aid are used even in normal years 
to employ rural labour in slack seasons in building irrigation works and 
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infrastructure including roads, the probability and intensity of crop 
failure can be reduced in the long run. Mellor and Gavian (1987) provide 
an incisive analysis of these issues. 
2.8. The Role of Food Aid in the Adjustment Process 
An important role for an expanded and more purposely used and sharply 
focused program of food in support of the "adjustment process" in 
developing countries has attracted attention, particularly in 
international bureaucracies involved in food aid (World Food Program 
(1987). Since by "adjustment" one means painful adjustment, anything that 
eases the pain will be welcomed by the adjustors. Analytically, there is 
nothing in food aid to suggest that it will ease the pain more than any 
other aid! If adjustment in the sense of reforming the policy framework, 
incentive structures and resource allocation mechanisms so as to enable 
the economy to perform efficiently and equitably in a changed external 
economic environment can be achieved without sacrificing growth, it is of 
course desirable. However, if the need for adjustment arises in large 
part from past policies that would not have been sustainable for long even 
if there had been no change in external environemnt, adjustment will 
necessarily involve sacrifices and even a pause in growth. In such 
circumstances, policy reform will not be credible (i.e. it will not remain 
in place for long if initiated) because the short-run resource 
reallocation and hardship will be too severe to permit political survival 
of the reforming regime. The availability of additional resources to the 
required extent to ease the pain of adjustment could bring credibility to 
reforms. It must be emphasized that this is a political and not 
necessarily economic argument--the reason is that the threat to political 
survival usually arises either because those who have to bear the burden 
of adjustment are politically powerful or because the burden is 
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inequitably distributed and not necessarily because the burden is too 
onerous if it is equitably shared, economically and politically. It also 
raises another troublesome issue: if development strategies pursued led to 
the crisis and not changes in external environment over which the country 
had no control, giving additional aid for adjustment in such a situation 
may encourage others to follow politically rewarding but economically 
unsustainable development strategies. 
Similar considerations apply to food aid tied to policy reform or to 
choice of particular projects even if these were not part of an adjustment 
program. If an economy is following an appropriate development strategy 
and the social cost of a project exceeds social benefits were food 
imported commercially, as argued earlier, a donor may induce the choice of 
the project by providing food aid at a sufficiently low social cost to the 
recipient. But if aid is given to reduce the political cost to the regime 
in the recipient country to induce it to implement a project the donor 
regime prefers (possibly for reaping political benefits at home), the 
argument shifts to the political arena. But to 'bribe', so to speak, the 
regime in the recipient country to change bad policies (introduce 'policy 
reform') will give the wrong signal to others. 
3. Trade Versus Aid in Combating Hunger: Agricultural Trade 
Liberalization or Larger Aid Flows? 
There is perhaps no country in the world in which the government does 
not intervene in the determination of agricultural output, foreign trade 
and prices. Obviously, interventions that affect a country's imports or 
exports, such as quotas, tariffs, voluntary export restrictions or import 
expansions not only affect that country but the international market, the 
quantitative significance of the effect depending on how large a trader 
the country happens to be in world markets. Less obviously, domestic 
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interventions, whether acreage rstrictions, set aside programs, credit 
subsidies, price supports etc. affect the international markets as well. 
The interventions are so many and their nature so complex that 
disentangling their individual effects is an almost impossible task. 
However, their combined effect in in terms of the difference between 
domestic and border prices (i.e. c.i.f. import prices or f.o.b. export 
prices) can be viewed as a measure of protection. By this measure average 
agricultural protection varied from -19% in Indonesia to a whopping 175% 
in Japan during 1975-1976. Only Australia, New Zealand and Thailand had 
negative protection besides Indonesia (Parikh et al (1986)). Of course, 
changes in the protection regime by one or more countries in the global 
market will affect all and call for adjustments by each. One needs a 
fairly sophisticated set of general equilibrium models, one for each 
country or region, linked together by global market clearing for a 
satisfactory analysis of changes in protection levels. A team of 
researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) put together a system of empirically estimated models, 
distinguishing 18 countries, two regions (EEC and the Eastern Bloc) and 15 
simpler models for groups of the remaining countries of the world (Parikh 
et al (1986), Parikh and Tims (1986)). The models distinguished 10 
commodities: wheat, rice, coarse grains, bovine and ovine meat, other 
animal products, dairy products, protein feeds, other food agriculture, 
non-food agriculutre and non-agriculture. The model solved for 
equilibrium domestic and international prices sequentially. The 
simulation period was 1980-2000. A reference simulation of basically 
unchanged policies was compared with simulations of policy scenarios 
ranging from unilateral trade liberalization by OECD and the developing 
countries to multilateral liberalization by all market economies. In 
addition to trade liberalization scenarios, several other scenarios were 
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simulated. In one, grain supplies in the world market are increased 
through (a) an extra SO million tons of wheat thrown on the world market 
each year, and (b) SO% reduction in the consumption of meat in OECD 
countries. In another, higher prices for producers in developing 
countries was assured by reducing OECD output by 2S%. In contrast with 
these scenarios whose impact on the poor works mainly through changes in 
market prices facing them, three aid scenarios were simulated. In 
scenario Al, developed countries provide additional aid to the tune of 
0.S% of GDP (over and above the present level of about 0.3S%) in the form 
of program aid. Additional aid is distributed to developing countries in 
inverse proportion to their per capita incomes. In scenario A2, 
additional aid is given as project-tied aid to be saved and invested. The 
results of market price mediated and aid mediated scenarios are shown in 
Tables 2 and 3 in terms of the number of persons hungry, 
nutirtionally adequate food energy intakes. 
i.e. not having 
These results show that market price mediated effects on hunger in 
developing countries are modest. For example, even though the volume of 
additional food needed to raise the food intake of the entire population 
of devleoping countries to nutritional adequacy is about SO million tons 
of wheat in 2000, simply adding SO million tons of wheat to the market 
supplies will reduce the number hungry by only 2%. reasonThe is that the 
global market systems adjust to the extra wheat put on the market through 
price reductions, shift of resources away from wheat etc. The net result 
is that, because of reduction in food output induced by these changes, the 
net addition to food consumption is far less than the SO million tons 
thrown on the market and the consumption of the poor increases even less. 
Interestingly, given the protection levels in developing countries, 
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consumers, particularly the poor, are better off when they liberalize and 
worse off and signficantly so when their domestic producer prices are 
increased. Agricultural protection in OECD and the consequent surplus 
disposal actually helps the poor in developing countries by reducing world 
market prices below what they would have been were there no surpluses. 
In contrast to the above, the results in Table 3 show substantial 
reductions in hunger, particularly in low income countries when the volume 
of aid is increased. It does not make any difference by year 2000 whether 
aid is program aid as project aid. However, with aid tied to investment, 
the time patern of reduction in hunger is different, with only a small 
reduction initially, but catching up with program aid by 2000. More 
significantly, the reduction in hunger with project tied aid persists even 
if aid is discontinued after 15 years. 
4. Subsidized Food Distribution, Food-For-Work Programs and Hunger in 
India 
The India model (Narayana et al 1987a, 1987b) of the BLS system of 
IIASA models distinguishes 5 different socio-economic groups within the 
rural and urban areas of India, each group defined by its monthly 
household real consumption expenditure per head. A household in each 
group has a claim on the output of the economy depending on its factor 
endowments, and any income transfers from the government and the direct 
taxes it pays. It saves part of its income and spends the rest on 
consumption of the ten commodities distinguished in the model, given their 
prices, according to a linear expenditure system separately estimated for 
each group. The mdoel is thus better equipped to analyze income 
distribution issues than representative consumer models. 
In the simulations with the model reported here, India is viewed as a 
small open economy facing parametrically given international prices, the 
time path of which was taken from the reference scenario of the BLS system 
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Table 2 
Global Food Market and Hun~er 
Scenario 
1. Reference (million persons) 
2. 50% more wheat in the market 
3. 50% less meat consumption in OECD 
4. Better producer prices in developing 
countries 
5. Agricultural trade liberalization 
(a) By all market economies 
(b) By developing countries 
(c) By OECD countries 

















of which India 
Source: Parikh and Tims 
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as a whole. In the reference scenario a basket of rice, wheat and coarse 
grains (in fixed proportions) weighing approximately 135 kgs. is 
distributed to all urban residents in each year at a subsidized price 
(approximately 20% subsidy). The foodgrains needed are purchased from 
thefarmers at a price below the equlibrium open market price. Three 
alternative distribution policy scenarios are compared with the reference 
scenario. (i) in DO both subsidized public distribution and food purchase 
at below market prices from farmers are abolished, (ii) in Dl, 100 kgs. of 
wheat is distributed free of charge to all residents of India (rural and 
urban), with the cost of procuring the needed grains being financed by 
additional income taxes, (iii) in D2, the cost of free distribution of 
food is accomodated by a reduction in aggregate investment while keeping 
the tax rate fixed at its level in the referene scenario. The results are 
presented in Table 4 in terms of the population in each expenditure group 
and its average equivalent expenditure (i.e. the expenditure needed at 
1970 prices to achieve the same welfare as is being attained in the 
relevant scenario in year 2000). Thus, equivalent expenditures are 
comparable across scenarios. 
It is seen from Table 4 that the abolition of the distribution of 
subsidized food distribution in urban areas (and the associated implicit 
procurement tax on food producers in rural areas) in DO as compared to the 
reference scenario, as is to be expected, improves rural income 
distribution slightly and worsens the urban distribution. The macro 
indicators do not differ much. Interestingly, extension of the public 
distribution of foodgrains to rural areas, making it completely free and 
financing it through an increse in income taxes (levied mainly on the 
urban rich) in Dl improves rural income distribution significantly: the 
number of persons in the poorest class falls by 57 millions compared to 
REF, the number of persons in the middle three income groups rise and the 
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Table 4 
Impact of Alternative Public Distribution Policies in Year 2000 
Exp. REF DO Dl D2 
Group p E p E p E p E 
Rural 
1 147.6 132.8 149.1 136.3 90.6 153.4 97.0 153.5 
2 114.0 261.4 113.8 270.6 135.5 261.4 138.9 261.7 
3 136.0 399.1 135.2 413.5 154.4 401.5 153.7 401.9 
4 154.9 616.2 154.8 634.3 165.8 613.4 169.7 615.5 
5 166.0 1227.3 165.7 1233.8 172.4 1169.2 159.2 1168.1 
Urban 
1 1.5 171.8 2.4 169.2 0.6 171.3 0.9 170.3 
2 10.6 272.9 12.2 271.6 8.3 271.2 11. 7 269.6 
3 41. 2 394.8 42.5 390.6 39.4 392.7 47.7 393.1 
4 109.0 604.9 108.0 596. 7 110.4 596.0 116.4 600.3 










day) 2569 2581 2610 2539 
GINI-E 0.3445 0.3418 0.3100 0.3149 
P: Population in millions. Total rural population is 718 millions and urban 
population is 330 in all scenarios. 
E: Equivalent Expenditure Per Capita (1970 Rupees). 
Source: An unpublished longer version of Narayana et al (1987a). 
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number in richest group falls. The income distribution in urban areas 
also improves though not as dramatically. With investment kept unchanged, 
aggregate growth (i.e. GDP) is essentially unchanged, while the average 
energy intake rises and the Gini coefficient of equivalent expenditure 
falls. When the free distribution of food is financed by a reduction in 
investment rather than through an increase in taxes as in D2, naturally 
aggregate growth is affected--GDP is less by about 10% and the 
improvements in income distribution in rural areas are slighty attenuated 
compared to Dl. An implication of the comparison between Dl and D2 is 
that if the free distribution of food could be financed through aid, 
rather than tax increases, the improvements in Dl as compared to REF would 
be even more dramatic. 
Rural works programs (RWP) in India are meant to provide gainful 
employment to rural workers, particularly during slack seasons, in 
creating productive assets. The facts that the participation in these 
programs was voluntary and largely the poor participate are added 
advantages in that these enable better targeting of the poor for other 
poverty alleviation programs. However, the execution of these programs 
has been criticised on the grounds that the works are often poorly 
designed and hence unproductive and that the benefits largely accrue to 
non-target groups because of corruption etc. In specifying rural works 
scenarios in the model, the efficiency of design and targeting can be 
varied. 
More specifically, the two poorest expenditure classes constitute the 
target groups. Each person in these two classes together receives an 
average of 100 kgs. of wheat per year as wages for participation in RWP, 
while each person in the poorest class receives 125 kg. Other inputs 
besides labor are needed for constructing rural works and the cost of 
these inputs are assumed to be 50% of the wage bill. Half of the works 
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created are assumed to be used for agricultural prouction and the other 
half for non-agricultural production. 
If the RWP is well designed and executed, the value of the entire 
expenditure is translated into assets of equal value. At the other 
extreme, a poorly designed and executed program spends the resources but 
creates no productive assets. Thus, efficiency is defined as the ratio of 
the value of assets created to the value of resources spent, and this 
ratio 'e' takes two values 1 and 0. Targeting failure is captured by a 
parameter 't' taking the values 1 and .5. Thus, a proportion 't' of the 
wage bill is assumed to reach the two poorest rural expenditure groups 
(the target groups) and the remaining (1-t) accrues to all the other rural 
classes in proportion to their population. Scenarios are designated by 
R-e-t. Thus, R-1-1 means a well-designed and well-targeted rural works 
program. The two alternative values fort and e together yield 4 
scenarios in all of which the expenditure on rural works is financed by 
reducing other investment (compared to the referene scenario) rather than 
through increases in taxes. However, in scenario R-1-1-T the cost of 
rural works is financed by additional taxation while keeping investment 
unchanged as in the reference scenario. The results are presented in 
Table 4 in terms of the value of the relevant variable in the policy 
scenario as a percentage of its value in the reference scenario. 
It is clear from Table 5 that rural works programs have a substantial 
impact on the poor. A well-executed and targeted program raises the 
equivalent and energy intake of the poorest class by 30% and next poorest 
by 40% relative to the reference scenario with no rural works. With their 
cost coming out of investment, aggregate growth is somewhat lower. As is 
to be expected, a poorly executed and well-targeted program sitll yields 
the same benefits for the poor--because they are the beneficiaries of the 
expenditure on the program. But spending resources in creating 
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Table 5 
Impact of Alternative Rural Works Programs 
Variable Scenario* 
R-1-1 R-1-0 R-0.5-1 R-0.5-0 R-1-1-T 
Average Real GDP Growth 
Rate (1980-2000) 95.l 85.6 96.1 87.0 104.3 
Average Equivalent 
Expenditure Per Capita in 2000: 
India 99.8 94.6 100.0 95.3 102.2 
Poorest Rural Class 167.0 167.0 133.0 133.0 167.0 
Two Poorest Rural Classes 139.0 139.0 119.0 119.0 139.0 
Average Energy Intake Per Capita 
(kcals per day) in 2000: 
India 104.7 102.6 103.0 101.0 105.7 
Poorest Rural Class 170.0 170.0 140.0 133.0 170.0 
Two Poorest Classes 140.0 140.0 120.0 119.0 140.0 
*Each variable is expressed as an index with its reference run value set at 
100. 
Source: Narayana et al (1987b). 
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unproductive assets naturally affects aggregate growth adversely (compare 
R-1-1 with R-1-0 or R-0.5-1 with R-0.5-0). Targeting failure reduces the 
benefits to the poor by nearly a half (compare R-1-1 with R-0.5-1 or R-1-0 
with R-0.5-0). If a well-executed and targeted program can be financed 
through additional taxes rather than by reduction in investment, the poor will 
benefit as much and the economy will gain growth. A fortiori, if instead of 
addtional taxes, aid becomes available, benefits as well as growth could be 
even further augmented. 
5. Food Aid: Some Relevant Experience 
food aid in the form of cereals has declined substantially from its peak 
in the mid-sixties. There was a decline of nearly 10 million tons in food aid 
by the USA in 1984-85 from a peak of over 17 milion tonnes in 1965-66 (see 
Table 1). This was compensated only partially by the emergence of other 
donors, mainly the EEC. The decline in US aid was mainly due to changes in 
the domestic price support program. Briefly stated, the program, as it 
operated until the mid-sixties, contributed to the accumulation of stocks 
which reached a peak of over 1.5 billion bushels of wheat or over 118% of all 
uses in 1960-61. In part, as a means of stock disposal, food aid shipments 
also grew from under 150 million bushels in the early fifties to a peak of 572 
million bushels in 1965. The so-called 'loan rate,' or basic support price, 
was reduced from $2.00 per bushel in 1962 progressively to $1.25 in 1965. 
Taken together with other supports, the overall reduction was from $2.00 in 
1962 to $1.69 in 1965. Stocks began declining and with the extraordinary food 
aid shipment to India in the two drought years of 1965-66 and 1966-67, they 
fell to a low of 513 million bushels in 1966-67 or 36% of all uses. Although 
stocks then rose only to fall again to an even lower value of 340 million 
bushels in 1974, the year of large sales of wheat to the Soviet Union, they 
recovered and surpassed their 1960-61 peak in 1982-83 in absolute terms. 
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However relative to all uses, the 1982-83 stock was only 63% as contrasted 
with 118% in 1960-61. This was in part due to a rise in domestic consumpmtion 
relative to production, but also due to non-food aid exports, particularly to 
USSR and eastern Europe, becoming significant in the seventies. Aid shipments 
did not recover, and, after falling to a low of 58 million bushels in 1973, 
they were back in 1984 to 158 million bushels, a level reached in the fifties. 
It must also be added that the terms of US food aid also became harder. For 
example, payment in terms of local currency was phased out, the impact of 
which can be seen from the fact that in the peak aid year of 1965 nearly 70% 
of 512 million bushels of wheat exports under aid programs was sold for 
foreign soft currency. By 1972 none of it was. Further, recipient countries 
had to bear an increasing share of transport and other costs as well. (Wheat 
stock and other data are drawn from several USDA publications.) 
It was mentioned earlier that until the mid-sixties a large fraction of 
food aid went to India and Pakistan. In both countries a development strategy 
based on import substituting industrialization was facilitated by cereal 
imports under food aid which were used to supply a substantial part of the 
subsidized distribution of grains through ration shops in urban areas. Such 
rationing helped reduce food costs for workers in organized manufacturing 
industries and in the public sector. When India experienced two consecutive 
droughts of unusual severity in 1965-66 and 1966-67, famine was barely averted 
by the importation of over 10 million tonnes of cereals largely under PL480 
food aid from USA. Lele and Agarwal (1987) suggest that the unacceptable 
political conditionality imposed with this aid (see Section 2.6 above) led 
Indian authorities to shift resources to agriculture so as to achieve 
self-sufficiency in food as quickly as possible and become less vulnerable to 
food blackmail. They also point out that earlier US technical assistance 
(governmental as well as private, mainly from the Rockefeller and Ford 
Foundations) in setting up agricultural universities and strengthening 
research capability in plant breeding, helped India to reap substantial gains 
from the green revolution technology that became available in the mid-sixties. 
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As pointed out earlier, the political pressure interpretation of US-India 
food aid relationship is not universally accepted. For example, India's 
ambassador to the USA at that time has denied that any political pressure was 
applied along with food aid. However, the contribution of agricultural 
universities and the Indian Agricultural Reserach Institute in breeding 
varieties more suitable to Indian agro-climatic conditions has been extremely 
important in the success of the green revolution. But external aid to these 
institutions was technical assistance and not food aid. 
Another major recipient of food aid in the fifties and sixties was Egypt. 
Handoussa (1987) claims that during 1959-66 the availability of food aid under 
PL 480 enabled Egypt to save foreign exchange that would otherwise have been 
spent on commercial food imports. The saved foreign exchange was spent on 
importing capital goods needed for industrial investment and growth. More 
than a third of merchandise imports in 1975 and a fourth in 1984 were 
accounted for by food imports, mainly of wheat, vegetable oils and sugar. 
Rice exports and output of wheat declined during 1975-85. Cereal imports 
increased from about 50% of domestic production in 1975 to 100% in 1984-85. 
Cereal consumption grew at a phenomenal 15% per year on an average during the 
same period. This course of events was largely due to the heavily subsidized 
food distribution policy backed by imported food that was shown to be 
politically difficult to change by the riots that ensued when a reduction in 
the subsidy was attempted. 
In the seventies and the eighties sub-saharan African countries have been 
the major recipients of food aid. To cite just a few cases from a study on 
Managing Agricultural Development in Africa by the World Bank, during the 
period 1970-85 the volume of food aid grew at an average annual rate of 4.1% 
in Cameroon, 43.1% in Kenya, 28.6% in Malawi, and 23.5% in Tanzania. Ezekiel 
(1986) states that between 1985 and 1990 food aid requirements will grow by 
about 25% in Kenya, 20% in Tanzania, 15% in Senegal and 14% in Cameroon. 
There is also an increasing tendency to use food aid as a lever to promote 
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structural adjustment and policy reform (World Food Programme (1987)). For 
example, in the late seventies the US provided food aid to Bangladesh more or 
less as a grant under Title III of PL480 in a multi-year program to sustain 
Bangladesh's attempt to reduce food subsidies and move towards an open market 
food pricing system. Eleven food aid donors, including the World Food 
Progamme (WFP), have agreed to provide food aid to Mali in return for her 
restructuring the cereal marketing system, reducing the deficits of the 
parastatal marketing boards, stabilizing cereal prices and improving farm 
incomes. A more broad-ranging reform of the agricultural sector conditioned 
on food aid is being attempted in Senegal and Madagascar. In Ghana, where 
disastorous policies had resulted in a substantial fall in real wages and 
productivity over several years, under WFP and the World Bank,food aid, is 
being used to augment the real wages of workers engaged in key export sectors 
as well as in the improvement of roads, post facilities and other 
infrastructure. In Grenada, local resources generated from sales of food aid 
have been earmarked for specific use in support of a structural adjustment and 
reform plan. On the other hand, in Morocco, food aid is to be used in a 
compensatory program for people placed at nutritional risk during a structural 
adjustment plan aimed at the elimination of food subsidies by 1990. The 
adjustment program was expected to reduce the real income of the very poor by 
a fifth placing them at nutritional risk. By expanding ongoing supplementary 
feeding and school feeding projects using additional project food aid provided 
by the US and World Food Programme, this risk is expected to be avoided. 
Since the results from most of these program are not yet available for 
evaluation, it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of food aid in easing 
structural adjustment costs. 
6. Policy Implications and Conclusions 
Food aid can play a useful role in furthering development and poverty 
amelioration in situations in which the recipient country is generally 
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following an appropriate development strategy and the aid is used either in 
support of distributive policies that are effectively targeted at the poor or 
in financing efficiently executed and effectively targeted investment 
projects. On the other hand, the use of any aid, in the form of food or 
foreign exchange, in support of policy reform and adjustment has to be 
carefully thought through so that it does not end up encouraging the very 
thing it wants to eliminate, viz. inappropriate policies. Of course, the 
effectiveness of the use of food aid can be enhanced substantially through 
proper design, the choice of commodities, the flexibility with which 
recipients could exchange with each other commodities supplied by aid and 
their own output so as to make each recipient achieve greater benefits etc. 
(Mellor and Ezekiel (1987), Hopkins (1987). 
During the 50's and 60's the US and Canada were the major food aid donors 
and South Asian states of India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent 
other Asian states (Korea and the Philippines) got most of the aid. With the 
dramatic increase in food output in all of them and some of them accumulating· 
large food stocks (over 25 million tons in India in June 1987) in the 
eighties, it is tempting to conclude that purposively used food aid is a major 
factor in this turn-about. However, such a conclusion is too facile. 
Certainly, food aid at concessional terms, particularly in years when domestic 
output was way below trend levels because of unprecedented droughts, helped 
India avert what could have been major disasters. But, whatever push or 
persuasion or leverage that aid donors may have applied, it is the 
availability in the mid~sixties of dwarf varieites of wheat and rice with high 
yield response to the use of heavy doses of chemical fertilizers that largely 
explains the turn about. Some of the domestic policy distortions, such as the 
zonal restrictions in the movement of food, had been removed even earlier. Of 
course, the new technology brought in its wake new distortions: fertilizer 
subsidies, irrigation subsidies, price support at levels that led to 
accumulation of stocks etc, although the extent of their distortionary effects 
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is hard to judge since the distortions in favour of agriculture were in part 
corrections for distortions in other sectors that in effect penalized 
agriculture. It may be time now to remove or reduce these distortions. Still, 
the fact remains, that the availability of technology and the desire to 
exploit it induced these, albeit distortionary, producer incentives. 
With Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) replacing South Asia as the major recipient 
of food aid (the share of SSA in cereal aid has gone up steadily from under 5% 
in 1970-71 to nearly 50% in 1984-85), it may be thought that in SSA also, food 
aid leverage can be used to turn the situation around. Extreme caution is 
warranted before any such conclusion is drawn. First of all, the domestic 
policy distortions with respect to agriculture in SSA appear to be far more 
serious and pervasive than they ever were in South Asia. In fact, South Asia 
never experienced a decline in the trend of growth of food or agricultural 
output, let alone a negative trend. Although severe droughts in the Sahel 
etc. are partly responsible, still the declining trend in SSA output is a 
·reflection largely of policy failures. Most important of all, in South Asia a 
research infrastructure existed that could rapidly turn out rice and wheat 
varieties that were bred to suit local conditions, once the dwarf genes became 
available. And in addition, an extension service for spreading the knowledge 
about new varieties could be assembled, although some may claim that it is 
still inadequate. None of these conditions exist in SSA to the same extent, 
not to mention the differences in soil, climate and factor endowments between 
SSA and South Asia. One should not be unduly optimistic about the quick 
success of food aid conditional on policy reform. To put it more bluntly, 
dommestic policy failure is the cause and the current food aid levels are 
symptoms of the food crisis in SSA. It remains to be seen whether policy 
reform-conditioned food aid will prove to be a cure. 
Finally, for reasons discussed earlier, linking food aid with structural 
adjustment is problematic. In any case, the adjustment problems in SSA and in 
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the heavily indebted, but considerably richer, Latin America are very 
different. It is unlikely that in much better agriculturally endowed Latin 
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